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California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
I. INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement agencies have increasingly employed aerial
surveillance in order to detect illegal activities.1 When presented
with the police's use of aerial observation, the lower courts have
been unable to provide a consistent method of analysis to determine
whether warrantless aerial surveillance constitutes an "unreasona-
ble search" under the fourth amendment.2 The Supreme Court re-
cently attempted to resolve this issue in California v. Ciraolo.3 In this
case, the Santa Clara Police received an anonymous tip that Ciraolo
was growing marijuana in his backyard.4 In order to confirm this
information, the police without first obtaining a warrant chartered
an airplane and made naked-eye observations of Ciraolo's home and
his backyard. 5 Ciraolo argued that the warrantless aerial surveil-
lance of his home and its curtilage constituted an unconstitutional
search under the fourth amendment. 6 The Supreme Court held in a
1 Recent Developments, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitutional Analysis, 35
VAN. L. REv. 409 (1982)[hereinafter Warrantless Aerial Surveillance].
2 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Through the fourteenth amendment, the fourth amendment
applies to the states. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949). Concerning the conflict in the lower courts, see generally, Warrantless
Aerial Surveillance, supra note 1, at 416-31; Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial
Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725, 739-50 (1985); Annotation,
Aerial Observation or Surveillance as Violative of Fourth Amendment Guaranty Against Unreasona-
ble Search and Seizure, 56 A.L.R. Fed. 772 (1982).
3 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
4 Id. at 1810.
5 Id. at 1814 (Powell,J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 1812. See infra notes 30-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
curtilage doctrine and its importance in fourth amendment jurisprudence.
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five-to-four decision that the warrantless observation of Ciraolo's
backyard from navigable airspace did not violate the fourth
amendment. 7
This Note begins with a brief discussion of the legal history of
the fourth amendment and the curtilage doctrine. The Note then
summarizes both the background of the case and the majority and
dissenting opinions. Moreover, the Note analyzes these opinions by
examining the internal inconsistencies in the Court's precedent and
the conflicting interpretations of that precedent. Finally, the Note
discusses the future implications of the Court's holding.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Prior to achieving independence from Great Britain, the colo-
nists frequently experienced arbitrary searches and seizures under
the "writs of assistance."8 In order to enforce British tax laws, the
writs of assistance gave colonial revenue officers the authority to
search wherever they pleased for smuggled goods.9 In 1761, James
Otis, Jr. argued on behalf of sixty-three Boston merchants against
the issuance of the writs.' 0 Otis characterized the writs as "the
worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English
liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found
in an English law book," because they placed "the liberty of every
man in the hands of every petty officer."' "I Although Otis lost this
particular case,' 2 the debate served as a catalyst for colonial resist-
ance against the abusiveness of British rule.' 3 Remembering these
indiscriminate governmental intrusions upon the privacy of the col-
onists, the framers of the Constitution adopted the fourth
amendment. 14
The framers sought to preclude more than the general abuses
of the writs of assistance through the fourth amendment. The pro-
7 106 S. Ct. at 1813. The majority in Ciraolo included ChiefJustice Burger andJus-
tices White, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor. The dissenting justices were Justices
Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. ChiefJustice Burger wrote the opinion for
the Court, and Justice Powell wrote the single dissenting opinion.
8 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
9 Id.
10 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 1.1, at 4 (1978).
11 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625 (quoting Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 301-03).
12 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 10, § 1.1, at 4.
13 Referring to the debate concerning the writs of assistance, John Adams stated that
'then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims
of Great Britain. Then and there the child of Independence was born.'" Boyd, 116 U.S.
at 625.
14 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980).
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visions of the amendment" 'reached farther than the concrete form'
of the specific cases that gave it birth, and 'apply to all invasions on
the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life.' "15
The warrant requirement in the fourth amendment places a
"neutral and detached magistrate" between the eagerness of police
officers to discover evidence of criminal activity and an individual's
privacy.' 6 The magistrate determines whether or not sufficient
probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a search warrant.' 7
Unlike government enforcement officials, who may become over-
zealous in their efforts to detect crime and enforce the law, the mag-
istrate occupies a position that allows him to evaluate and balance
the needs of the police against the privacy interests of society.' 8
Under the fourth amendment, searches conducted without the
prior issuance of a warrant are per se unreasonable. 19 Only under
limited circumstances may the police conduct a search without first
obtaining a warrant. 20 Although the fourth amendment does not
specifically prescribe what penalties the government will incur
should its agents engage in an unconstitutional search, the Court
'5 Id. at 585 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630). ChiefJustice Burger reaffirmed that the
scope of fourth amendment protection goes beyond protecting individuals from the co-
lonial abuses that instigated the adoption of the amendment. He observed that
[a]lthough the searches and seizures which deeply concerned the colonists, and
which were foremost in the minds of the Framers, were those involving invasions of
the home, it would be a mistake to conclude.., that the Warrant Clause was there-
fore intended to guard only against intrusions into the home. First, the Warrant
Clause does not in terms distinguish between searches conducted in private homes
and other searches. Moreover, if there is little evidence that the Framers intended
the Warrant Clause to operate outside the home, there is no evidence at all that
they intended to exclude from protection of the Clause all searches occuring
outside the home .... What we do know is that the Framers were men who focused
on the wrongs of that day but who intended the Fourth Amendment to safeguard
fundamental values which would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it birth.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1977).
16 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
17 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). Probable cause exists
"where the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, and of which he has
reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed." Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967).
18 Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14. To allow police officers instead of a magistrate to deter-
mine when and where efficient law enforcement overrides an individual's privacy would
"reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only
in the discretion of police officers." Id. (footnote omitted).
19 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
20 The exceptions to the warrant requirement are: searches made contemporane-
ously with a lawful arrest, Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); searches
conducted while the police are engaged in "hot pursuit," Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 298-99 (1967); and when an individual consents to the search, Zap v. United States,
328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946).
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has strengthened the dictates of the amendment through its devel-
opment of the exclusionary rule.
In 1914, the Court first created the exclusionary rule in Weeks v.
United States.21 In Weeks, the Court held that government officials
who searched for and seized evidence in violation of the fourth
amendment could not then admit that evidence in criminal proceed-
ings taking place in federal courts. 22 Later, in Wolf v. Colorado, the
Court held that the fourth amendment did not require the exclusion
of unlawfully obtained evidence in state proceedings. 23 Ultimately,
the Court reversed itself in Mapp v. Ohio and held that the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment required the application of
the exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings. 24
The Court extended the scope of the exclusionary rule in what
has come to be known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doc-
trine.25 According to this doctrine, all evidence later discovered and
derived from an unconstitutional search or seizure also falls under
the exclusionary rule.2 6 Therefore, if the police unconstitutionally
gather evidence in order to demonstrate probable cause to a magis-
trate and thereby obtain a search warrant, the evidence seized dur-
ing the execution of the search warrant will still be inadmissible in
21 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Prior to Weeks, the court allowed the exclusion of evidence at
trial in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Because Boyd involved the violation
of the petitioner's fourth and fifth amendment rights, it is not viewed as the "original
source" of the exclusionary rule. Note, The Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule Under the Burger
Court, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 363, 363 n.4 (1981).
22 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
23 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
24 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). In Mapp, Justice Clark stated:
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforcea-
ble against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal
Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance
against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words,"
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human
liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would
be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom
from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard
as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
25 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
26 Writing the opinion for the Court in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984),
ChiefJustice Burger stated that
[u]nder this Court's holdings, the exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evi-
dence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence
later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or "fruit of the poisonous
tree." It "extends as well to the indirect as the direct products" of unconstitutional
conduct.




court.27 Government officials may avoid the application of the ex-
clusionary rule and its "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine by
demonstrating that the evidence obtained falls under one of the spe-
cific exceptions to the rule: the "independent source", "attenua-
tion", "inevitable discovery" or "good-faith" exceptions. 28
With the development of the exclusionary rule and its "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine, the Court has provided another check
upon police behavior in addition to the warrant requirement which
the fourth amendment expressly demands. In Mapp, the Court con-
cluded that "the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.' "29
III. THE CURTILAGE AND THE "OPEN FIELDS" EXCEPTION
The curtilage consists of "the land immediately surrounding
27 The California Court of Appeal noted in People v. Ciraolo that "an unconstitutional
search cannot be used as the basis for issuance of a search warrant or the Fourth Amend-
ment would be rendered meaningless." People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1801, 1806,
208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 95 (1984)(footnote and citations omitted).
28 United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980). While discussing the independ-
ent source exception to the exclusionary rule, Justice Holmes observed that
[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is
that not merely evidence so aquired shall not be used before the Court but that it
shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained
become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independ-
ent source they may be proved like any others....
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). See United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963);
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 278-80 (1961).
The independent source exception is closely related to the attenuation exception.
In Nardone, the Court analyzed the independent source exception and went on to note
that the connection between the government's illegal behavior and the evidence seized
"may have become so attenuated as to dissipate" the tainted nature of that evidence.
Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized the
existence of the inevitability exception in United States ex rel. Owens v. Twomey, 508
F.2d 858, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1974).
The Supreme Court discussed the good-faith exception in United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984). Under the good-faith exception, the prosecution may admit evi-
dence gathered pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate even though later
evidence reveals that no probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant. In People
v. Ciraolo, the California Court of Appeal found Leon inapplicable. Quoting Leon, the
court decided that the" 'good-faith exception for searches conducted pursuant to wan'ants
is not intended to signal our unwillingness strictly to enforce the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment .... .' " People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1085, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 93, 95 (1984)(emphasis in original)(quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
924 (1984)).




and associated with the home." o30 Although the fourth amendment
does not explicitly provide any protection to the curtilage, it does
protect "houses" from "unreasonable searches."' a In order to de-
termine the area of the curtilage, the lower courts have examined
the facts involved in the case to see if the property owner has mani-
fested some expectation of privacy in the area surrounding his
home.3 2
The common law views the curtilage as part of the house.33
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of the com-
mon law in its fourth amendment jurisprudence3 4 and has extended
some of that amendment's protection to the curtilage.3 5 The Court
noted that "the curtilage... has been considered part of the home
itself for Fourth Amendment purposes."3 6 The Court, however, ap-
pears unwilling to expressly provide the curtilage with the full pro-
tection of the fourth amendment.3 7
The fourth amendment's guaranty against unreasonable
30 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). Black's Law Dictionary defines
the curtilage, more broadly, as:
A piece of ground commonly used with the dwelling house. A small piece of
land, not necessarily inclosed, around the dwelling house, and generally includes
the buildings used for domestic purposes in the conduct of family affairs. A court-
yard or the space of ground adjoining the dwelling house necessary and convenient
and habitually used for family purposes and the carrying on of domestic employ-
ments. A piece of ground within the common inclosure belonging to a dwelling
house, and enjoyed with it for its more convenient occupation.
For search and seizure purposes includes those outbuildings which are directly
and intimately connected with the habitation and in proximity thereto and the land
or grounds surrounding the dwelling which are necessary and convenient and habit-
ually used for family purposes and carrying on domestic employment.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (5th ed. 1979).
31 See supra note 2.
32 William Blackstone viewed the existence of a common fence as one way to define
the curtilage. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225. The court of appeals found that
[w]hether the place searched is within the curtilage is to be determined from the
facts, including the proximity or annexation to the dwelling, its inclusion within the
general enclosure surrounding the dwelling, and its use and enjoyment as an ad-
junct to the domestic economy of the family.
Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932
(1956) (citation omitted).
33 In his discussion of the crime of burglary, William Blackstone notes that outbuild-
ings such as a "barn, stable, or warehouse" that are located on the same land as the
"dwelling-house" and surrounded by a common fence have the same protection against
burglary as the house itself. "[Flor the capital house protects and privileges all its
branches and appurtenants, if within the curtilage or homestall ...." 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *225.
34 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 597 n.45 (1980) ("We have long recognized the
relevance of the common law's special regard for the home to the development of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."(citation omitted)).
35 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
36 Id.
37 See infra note 129.
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searches may encompass the home and its curtilage, but the Court
has consistently refused to expand the scope of fourth amendment
protection to include "open fields." 38 The exact definition of open
fields, however, remains somewhat ambiguous. Open fields are
those areas located outside the curtilage 3 9 that" 'do not provide the
setting for those intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is
intended to shelter from governmental interference or surveil-
lance.' "40 According to the Court, "[a]n open field need be neither
'open' nor a 'field' as those terms are used in common speech." 4 '
Examples of open fields include: public highways and roads,42 farm-
land,43 and the woods located behind an individual's home.44 Since
the protections of the fourth amendment do not extend to the open
fields, government agents may constitutionally enter and observe
activities taking place there without first obtaining a warrant. 45
IV. THE DEFINITION OF A SEARCH UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
A search usually consists of an examination of a person, his
home or his property with the intent to discover contraband or
some other "evidence of guilt to be used in the prosecution of a
criminal action." 46 The fourth amendment, however, fails to ex-
pressly state what actions constitute a "search" that would trigger
the warrant requirement. 47 In order to deal with this ambiguity, the
Supreme Court has developed several methods of analysis to deter-
mine the existence of a "search" under the fourth amendment.
Through the adoption of the English common law, the Court
originally instituted a test to determine the existence of a fourth
amendment search based upon the concept of the "constitutionally
38 See, e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 170; Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
39 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.ll.
40 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 (1986)(quoting Oliver,
466 U.S. at 179).
41 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n. 11. Professor LaFave observed that "the lower courts
have applied the open fields characterization to virtually any lands which do not fall
within the curtilage." 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 10, § 2.4(a) at 332.
42 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).
43 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
44 Id. at 174.
45 Id. at 177. See Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861
(1974).
46 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1211 (5th ed. 1979). The exclusionary rule generally
applies to those searches "in which there is a quest for, a looking for, or a seeking out of
that which offends against the law by law enforcement personnel or their agents." Id.
See California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1819 (1986)(Powell,J., dissenting).
47 See supra note 2.
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protected area."' 48 According to the English common law, only
physical intrusions, such as a trespass, violated an individual's right
to privacy.49 A fourth amendment search of the home or its curti-
lage, therefore, could only take place when government agents com-
mitted a physical intrusion into these areas. 50 Since a search
consisted of an actual physical invasion, this meant that the ear or
the eye could not commit a search under the fourth amendment. 51
In Katz v. United States,52 the Court changed the focus of fourth
amendment jurisprudence by holding that the electronic wiretap-
ping of a public telephone booth constituted a "search" under the
fourth amendment. 53 The Court noted that the "constitutionally
protected area" concept based upon physical intrusion did not serve
as a "talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem. '54
The protection of the fourth amendment extended to people, not
places. 55
Writing the plurality opinion, Justice Stewart developed an am-
biguous and slightly contradictory privacy standard. He concluded
that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected."'56 Since Katz had
"justifiably relied" upon the privacy of the telephone booth, the
electronic interception and recording of his conversations was a
"search and seizure" under the fourth amendment. 57 This warrant-
48 The Court's emphasis on the English common law appears in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). Cases discussing the doctrine of the "constitutionally
protected area" include: Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57, 59 (1967); Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142-43
(1962); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510, 512 (1961).
49 Warrantless Aerial Surveillance, supra note 1, at 412.
50 The Court stated in Olmstead v. United States:
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to
our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a
defendent unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such
a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actualphysical invasion of
his house "or curtilage" for the purpose of making a seizure.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928)(emphasis added).
51 See, e.g., Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464 (wiretapping and recording private telephone
conversations without a warrant did not violate the fourth amendment); United States v.
Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (use of a searchlight or a field glass does not amount to a
search under the fourth amendment).
52 389 U.S. 347 (1967)(plurality opinion).
53 Id. at 353.
54 Id. at 351 n. 9.
55 Id. at 351.
5 Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
57 Id. at 353.
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less search and seizure did not fall within any of the exceptions to
the warrant requirement. 58 The search and seizure, therefore, were
unreasonable and violated the fourth amendment. 59
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan agreed that the Court
should abandon the definition of a search based upon physical intru-
sion.60 He warned that the physical intrusion test's "limitation on
Fourth Amendment protection is, in the present day, bad physics as
well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be de-
feated by electronic as well as physical invasion." 61 Justice Harlan
introduced the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis that the
Court would follow in subsequent decisions. 62
According to Justice Harlan, an individual has a "constitution-
ally protected reasonable expectation of privacy." 63 To delineate
the scope of fourth amendment protection of this privacy expecta-
tion, Justice Harlan's Katz test consists of a twofold inquiry. First, a
person has to have "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy." 64 Second, that expectation has to "be one that society is
58 Id. at 357-58. See supra note 20.
59 Id. at 357.
60 Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1811 (1986); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
63 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)(Harlan, J., concurring).
64 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The first prong of the Katz test has encountered
criticism from commentators and justices in subsequent cases. Critics have argued that
the first prong creates a sliding scale of fourth amendment protection. As advanced
surveillance techniques become more common, an individual will no longer have a sub-
jective expectation of privacy from this surveillance. For example, Professor Anthony
Amsterdam found:
An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a statement of
what Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment protects. It can neither
add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to fourth amendment
protection. If it could, the government could diminish each person's subjective ex-
pectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was
being advanced by a decade and that we were all forthwith being placed under com-
prehensive electronic surveillance.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974). Writ-
ing the opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun arrived at a similar conclusion in Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979):
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz' two-pronged inquiry would
provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection. For example, if the
Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes
henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals therafter might not in
fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and
effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this Nation's
traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously monitoring his tele-
phone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the contents of
his calls might be lacking as well. In such circumstances, where an individual's sub-
jective expectations had been "conditioned" by influences alien to well-recognized
Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play
[Vol. 77610
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prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "65
The Katz test, with its focus upon a person's reasonable expec-
tation of privacy, rather than upon a "constitutionally protected
area," made it appear that the concepts of the curtilage and the
open fields were no longer necessary in fourth amendment jurispru-
dence. Professor Wayne LaFave thought it rather "bizarre that the
curious concept of the curtilage, originally taken to refer to the land
and buildings within the baron's stone walls, should ever have been
deemed to be of controlling significance as to the constitutional lim-
its upon the powers of the police."'66
Seventeen years after Katz, in Oliver v. United States,67 the con-
cepts of the curtilage and the open fields returned, occupying an
important place in fourth amendment jurisprudence. In holding
that the intrusion of government agents into the open fields was not
a fourth amendment search, the Court adopted a literal interpreta-
tion of the fourth amendment purportedly within the framework of
the Katz test.68 First, the Court determined that the open fields did
not fall within any of the specific areas the fourth amendment
sought to protect. The open fields were not "persons," "papers" or
"effects." '69 Second, the Court concluded that "an individual may
not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of
doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the
home." 70
Under this literalistic fourth amendment analysis, the curtilage
once again derived its protected status from the home and not solely
from a reasonable expectation of privacy. The reemergence of the
curtilage doctrine also reintroduced the question of what protec-
tions the fourth amendment gives to the home that it does not give
to the curtilage.7'
no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection
was. In determining whether a "legitimate expectation of privacy" existed in such
cases, a normative inquiry would be proper.
Id. at 740 n.5. At one point, Justice Harlan abandoned the first prong of the Katz test
when he noted that "[tlhe analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective
expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks
we assume, are in large part reflections of the laws that translate into rules the customs
and values of the past and present." United States v. White, 410 U.S. 745, 786
(1971)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
65 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
66 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 10, § 2.3 at 314.
67 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
68 Id. at 176 n.6, 184.
69 Id. at 176-77.
70 Id. at 178.
71 See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
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V. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 2, 1982, an anonymous telephone caller in-
formed the Santa Clara Police that Dante Carlo Ciraolo was growing
marijuana in his backyard. 72 When Officer Shutz went to the
Ciraolo residence in order to investigate, he could not observe the
backyard from ground-level because a six-foot high outer fence and
a ten-foot high inner fence completely enclosed the backyard. 73
That same day, Shutz chartered a private airplane in order to
observe Ciraolo's fenced-in backyard. 74 Both Shutz and his com-
panion on the flight, Officer Rodriguez, had training in marijuana
identification. 75 Without first acquiring a warrant, 76 the two police
officers flew over Ciraolo's property and observed the marijuana
growing in his backyard.77 They also took aerial photographs of the
area.78 During the overflight, the aircraft remained in navigable air-
space at an altitude of one thousand feet.79
72 California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1810 (1986). Section 11358(a) of the Cali-
fornia Health & Safety Code provides:
Every person who plants, cultivates, harvests, dries or processes any marijuana or
any part thereof, except as otherwise provided by law, shall be punished by impris-
onment in the state prison for a period of not less than one year or more than 10
years and shall not be eligible for release upon completion of sentence or on parole
or any basis until he has been imprisoned for a period of not less than one year in
the state prison.
CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11358(a) (West 1975).
73 People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1085, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 94 (1984).
Because of the yard's location directly in back of the house, the house also constituted
part of the parimeter of the fence. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1814 (Powell, J., dissenting).
74 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1810.
75 Id. Marijuana has certain physical characteristics which enable trained police of-
ficers to identify the plant even from high altitudes. Marijuana has a distinct shade of
green which makes it distinguishable from the vegetation surrounding it. People v. St.
Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 889, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187, 189 (1980). The plant also has
its own particular configuration. Id. See Williams, Aerial Surveillance to Detect Growing Ma-
rijuana, 52 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 9, 11 (1983).
76 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1814 (Powell, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 1810.
78 Id. at 1810-11.
79 Id. at 1810. Regulations dictate the various altitudes at which a plane may lawfully
navigate. The Code of Federal Regulations provides, in relevant part, that
[e]xcept when necessary for takeoff or landing, no person may operate an aircraft
below the following altitudes:
(b) Over congested areas. Over any congested area of a city, town, or settlement, or
over any open air assembly of persons, an altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest
obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft.
(c) Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet above the surface except
over open water or sparsely populated areas. In that case, the aircraft may not be
operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure.
14 C.F.R. 91.79 (1986). All members of the public have a right to travel through naviga-
ble airspace. According to the United States Code, "[tihere is recognized and declared
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In his affidavit, Shutz described the anonymous telephone call
and his naked-eye, aerial observations of the marijuana growing in
Ciraolo's backyard.80 He also attached an aerial photograph of the
area to his affidavit.81 Based upon this information, Shutz obtained
a search warrant for Ciraolo's home and backyard.8 2 On September
9, 1982, the police executed the warrant and seized seventy-three
marijuana plants from Ciraolo's backyard.83
Invoking the California Penal Code, Ciraolo moved to have the
plants suppressed as evidence, and the trial court denied this mo-
tion.8 4 Ciraolo then pleaded guilty8 5 and was convicted for the cul-
tivation of marijuana.8 6 The California Court of Appeal reversed.8 7
In its decision, the court examined the protection the fourth
amendment afforded to the curtilage and the expectation of privacy
Ciraolo had concerning his backyard.88 The court concluded that
Ciraolo's backyard was within the curtilage and that he had dis-
played a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance
by constructing such tall fences around his yard.8 9 The court, how-
to exist in behalf of any citizen of the United States a public right of freedom of transit
through the navigable airspace of the United States." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1304 (1982).
80 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1814 (Powell, J., dissenting).
81 Id. The issuance of the warrant was based upon the affidavit of Officer Shutz re-
garding his observations of the marijuana and not upon the photograph. According to
Shutz's testimony, "the photograph did not identify the marijuana as such because it
failed to reveal a 'true representation' of the color of the plants: 'you have to see it with
the naked eye.'" Id. at 1812 n.l (citation omitted).
82 Id. at 1814. The warrant specifically allowed Shutz to search the house, its garage,
and the yard for "marijuana, narcotics paraphernalia, records relating to marijuana
sales, and documents identifying the occupant of the premises." Id. at 1814 n.1.
83 Id. at 1811.
84 People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1085, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 94 (1984). The
California Penal Code provides the grounds for which a defendant may move for the
suppression of evidence:
(a) Grounds. A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as
evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure
on either of the following grounds:
(1) The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.
(2) The search or seizure with a warrant was unreasonable because (i) the warrant
is insufficient on its face; (ii) the property or evidence obtained is not that described
in the warrant; (iii) there was not probable cause for the issuance of the warrant;
(iv) the method of execution of the warrant violated federal or state constitutional
standards; (v) there was any other violation of federal or state constitutional
standards.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(a) (West 1975).
85 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811.
86 People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1084, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 94 (1984); see
supra note 72.
87 People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 1090, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
88 Id. at 1087-89, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 96-98.
89 Id. at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97. In determining that Ciraolo's backyard was in
fact within the curtilage of the home, the court placed considerable emphasis on Oliver
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ever, failed to explicitly apply the second prong of the Katz test:
whether society would find Ciraolo's expectation of privacy from ae-
rial surveillance to be reasonable.
Without citing any authority, the court found that a qualitative
difference existed between routine aerial police patrols and focused
aerial surveillance of a specific home.90 The court then held that the
warrantless police flight over Ciraolo's curtilage, an area where he
had a reasonable expectation of privacy, violated the fourth amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable searches.9 1 The evidence
that the police officers gathered during this "unconstitutional
search" could not support a warrant.92 After the California
Supreme Court refused to review the case, the Supreme Court of
the United States granted certiorari. 93
VI. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger began his
fourth amendment analysis by restating both prongs of the Katz
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 1087-89, 208 Cal.
Rptr. at 96-97. The court also noted the Supreme Court's dicta in Oliver concerning
aerial surveillance. Writing the opinion for the Court in Oliver, Justice Powell stated that
"the public and police may lawfully survey lands from the air." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179
(footnote omitted). In order to support this conclusion, Justice Powell cited two federal
cases: United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1980), and United States v.
DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Mich. 1980). Id. at 179 n.9. The California Court
of Appeal distinguished these cases on the basis of their distinct facts. According to the
court's analysis of/Allen, the owners of a two hundred acre ranch near the Oregon sea-
coast did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance due to the
frequency of Coast Guard helicoptor overflights. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 1088, 208
Cal. Rptr. at 97. The court also distinguished DeBacker, finding that DeBacker involved
aerial surveillance of the open fields and not the curtilage. Id. at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at
97. The court then concluded that Justice Powell's dicta concerning aerial surveillance
did "not remove Fourth Amendment protection from the curtilage." Id., 208 Cal. Rptr.
at 97. The Supreme Court later confirmed this conclusion in two distinct ways. In the
Ciraolo decision, a case which involved aerial surveillance of the curtilage, the Court did
not mention the dicta in Oliver concerning aerial surveillance. In Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986), the Court expressly stated that "Oliver recognized
that in the open field context, 'the public and police lawfully may survey lands from the
air.'" Id. at 1826.
90 Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97. The court found this quali-
tative difference between the two types of overflights in the context of Ciraolo's reason-
able expectation of privacy. Id., 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97. The court seemed to suggest that
similar to the ranch owners in Allen, Ciraolo could not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy concerning routine aerial surveillance. Id., 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
91 Id. at 1090, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
92 Id., 208 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
93 California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1811 (1986).
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test.9 4 The ChiefJustice then determined whether Ciraolo had dis-
played a subjective expectation of privacy from naked-eye, aerial ob-
servation of his backyard and whether society would be willing to
accept this expectation as reasonable.95
The Court concluded that the existence of a ten-foot fence
around the backyard manifested Ciraolo's subjective expectation of
privacy from the surveillance of "normal sidewalk traffic." 96 The
fence constituted one of the "normal precautions" that an individ-
ual would take to protect his privacy from ground-level
observation.9 7
The Court noted, however, that a ten-foot fence would not con-
ceal Ciraolo's backyard from a person "on top of a truck or a 2-level
bus."98 It was therefore difficult for the Court to conclude that
Ciraolo had displayed a subjective expectation of privacy from "all"
surveillance of his backyard.9 9 Rather than attempt to settle this is-
sue, ChiefJustice Burger turned to the second part of the Katz test.
Prior to adjudicating the reasonableness of Ciraolo's expecta-
tion of privacy, ChiefJustice Burger reaffirmed the Court's language
in Oliver regarding the factors that delineate the scope of fourth
amendment protection.100 The examination of reasonableness does
94 Id. at 1811.
95 Id. In the lower court, both parties focused on the reasonableness ofaerial surveil-
lance in general and did not raise the issue of the photograph that the Santa Clara Police
took of Ciraolo's backyard and the surrounding area. This issue, therefore, did not be-
come a factor in the opinion of the Court. Id. at 1812 n.1.
96 Id. at 1812.
97 Id. In determining the manifestation and context of an individual's expectation of
privacy, the Court will scrutinize the conduct of that individual. For example, in Katz the
petitioner shut the door of the telephone booth and paid the toll which would allow him
to make a call. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). By taking these actions,
he was "entitled to assume that the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world." Id.
In another case, David Rawlings placed a large quantity of illegal drugs into the
purse of Vanessa Cox. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 101 (1980). While executing
an arrest warrant, the police searched the purse and discovered the drugs. Id. The
Court found that Rawlings did not have a subjective expectation of privacy concerning
the contents of the purse. Id. at 106. In reaching this conclusion, the Court took cogni-
zance of the fact that Rawlings placed illegal drugs worth thousands of dollars into the
purse of a woman he had only known for a short time. Id. at 105. Rawlings also did not
attempt to exclude others from gaining access to the purse. Id. These actions on the
part of Rawlings led the Court to conclude that he did not take "normal precautions" to
protect his privacy interest in the purse. Id. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740
(1979)("The first [inquiry] is whether the individual, by his conduct, has 'exhibited an ac-
tual (subjective) expectation of privacy.' ")(quoting Katz, 289 U.S. at 361)(emphasis
added).





not focus upon the private activities that an individual desires to
keep secret. Rather, the Court should inquire " 'whether the gov-
ernment's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values
protected by the Fourth Amendment.' "101
After a cursory examination of the curtilage doctrine, the Court
found that Ciraolo's backyard was in fact within the curtilage of the
house. 10 2 This determination, however, did not end the Court's
analysis, because the fourth amendment does not prohibit "all" po-
lice observation of the area within the curtilage. 10 3 Chief Justice
Burger then explained the circumstances under which the police
may view the curtilage without committing an unconstitutional
search.
Although the fourth amendment specifically protects houses
from unreasonable governmental intrusion, the amendment does
not demand that police officers "shield their eyes" every time they
go by a house while traveling on "public thoroughfares."' 10 4
Whatever actions an individual may have taken to conceal the activi-
ties occurring on his property, a police officer may constitutionally
observe the property "from a public vantage point where he has a
right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible."' 0 5
In order to support this conclusion, the Court cited one case,
United States v. Knotts.106 Knotts involved the placement of a radio
transmitter, commonly known as a "beeper," inside a container of
chloroform, a chemical used in manufacturing illicit drugs.' 07 Law
enforcement officials used both the "beeper" and visual surveillance
to follow the container to a secluded cabin.' 08 Anyone could have
followed the car with the container of chloroform as it traveled
along public roads to the cabin.'0 9 Knotts, therefore, did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy from "visual observations of...
[the] . . . automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a public
highway, nor [from] movements of objects such as the drum of chlo-
101 Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-83 (1984)).
102 Id. The brevity of the Court's analysis regarding the applicability of the curtilage
doctrine resulted from several factors. First, the close proximity of the fenced-in backy-
ard to Ciraolo's home gave the yard the necessary characteristics of a curtilage. Id. Sec-
ond, the state of California accepted that the yard, along with the marijuana growing




106 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
107 Id. at 278.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 281-82.
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roform outside the cabin in the 'open fields.' "110 Because the
"beeper" did not reveal anything more than the police would have
been able to see with their own eyes, its use did not constitute a
search under the fourth amendment."'
Next, ChiefJustice Burger quoted from the plurality decision in
Katz. The Court reaffirmed that the fourth amendment does not
protect those things or activities that an individual "'knowingly ex-
poses'" to the public from warrantless observation. 112 Applying
this reasoning to the facts of the case, the Court found that Ciraolo
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from naked-eye,
aerial surveillance of his backyard." 3 The Santa Clara police of-
ficers made their observations from navigable airspace in a "physi-
cally nonintrusive manner." 114  They observed what numerous
other members of the public flying in the navigable airspace over
Ciraolo's house could have observed. 115 Society, therefore, would
110 Id. at 282 (citation omitted).
111 Id. at 285. It could be argued that the Court in Knotts apparently found a constitu-
tional distinction between police surveillance of activities taking place in the open fields
and of those taking place within the curtilage. Chief Justice Burger in Ciraolo failed to
perceive this distinction. Justice Powell, on the other hand, commented upon this dis-
tinction in his dissent. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1818 (1986)(Powell, J.,
.dissenting).
The Court's dicta in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, (1984), however, subtly
points in these different directions at the same time. This case also involved the use of a
"beeper." The issue in the case revolved around the fact that the "beeper" gave the
police information that they could not have confirmed with their eyes-whether the
container with the "beeper" was still located within the home. Id. at 715. In discussing
this issue, the Court stated:
[H]ad a DEA agent thought it useful to enter the Taos residence to verify that the
ether was actually in the house and had he done so surreptitiously and without a
warrant, there is little doubt that he would have engaged in an unreasonable search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. For the purposes of the Amend-
ment, the result is the same where, without a warrant, the Government surrepti-
tiously employs an electronic device to obtain information that it could not have
obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house.... Even if visual surveillance
has revealed that the article to which the beeper is attached has entered the house, the
later monitoring not only verifies the officer's observations but also establishes that
the article remains on the premises.
Id. (emphasis added). The question then becomes how could the government constitu-
tionally watch the article enter the house without unconstituionally viewing the curtilage
at the same time?
112 Ciraolo. 106 S. Ct. at 1812 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967)). The Court selectively quoted the language of the plurality opinion in Katz. See
supra note 56 and accompanying text.
I'I Id. at 1813.
114 Id. The Court's holding in Katz expressly rejected the contention that only a phys-
ical intrusion by law enforcement personnel would constitute a search under the fourth
amendment. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. See infra notes 125-26, 133-34 and accompanying
text.
115 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813. Even though most members of the public flying in
navigable airspace would not have the specialized training necessary to identify mari-
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not view as reasonable Ciraolo's expectation of privacy from aerial
observation of his curtilage."16
The Court also attempted to distinguish Ciraolo from Katz on
the facts. CitingJustice Harlan's fears in Katz concerning the poten-
tial intrusions upon private communications from modern technol-
ogy, Chief Justice Burger stressed that these fears did not involve
"simple visual observations from a public place." 117 According to
the Court, Justice Harlan would not have considered an airplane a
form of modern technology that would secretly impinge upon an
individual's privacy as did the electronic listening devices in Katz. 81 8
Finally, the Court invoked the language ofJustice Harlan's con-
currence in Katz in order to support its holding in the Ciraolo case.
Justice Harlan stated in his concurrence that an individual expects
privacy in his own home, "but objects, activities, or statements that
he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' be-
cause no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited."' "19
juana plants at high altitudes, the Court found the fact that the two police officers had
this training to be irrelevant. Id.
The Court also did not find any relevancy in the distinction the California Court of
Appeal drew between "routine" police patrols and "focused" police observation. Id. at
1813 n.2. The Court found it difficult to comprehend how Ciraolo's expectation of pri-
vacy from focused aerial surveillance of his backyard would be any different from an
expectation of privacy from routine aerial observation. Id. Making an analogy to
ground-level observations, ChiefJustice Burger concluded that "[t]he fact that ground-
level observation by the police 'focused' on a particular place is not different from a
'focused' aerial observation under the fourth amendment." Id.
116 Id. at 1813.
117 Id.
118 Id. At this point in its analysis of Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz, the Court
apparently attempted to limit Katz to its own specific facts. Because Katz involved war-
rantless surveillance of telephone conversations, the Court concluded that Justice
Harlan specifically feared the potential intrusion upon the privacy of individuals through
the government's employment of moder, electronic surveillance devices. Id. Given the
fact that airplanes were commonplace in 1967, the date of the Katz decision, the Court
determined that Justice Harlan would not have viewed an airplane as a modern device
that "could stealthily intrude upon an individual's privacy." Id.
119 Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). By using the phrase
"plain view" in his concurrence in Katz, Justice Harlan blurred the distinction between
the "plain view" doctrine and the "open view" doctrine. In the context of fourth
amendment searches and seizures, the plain view doctrine has two specific applications.
First, in those situations where a police officer is conducting an arrest and "is not search-
ing for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an in-
criminating object," the officer may seize the evidence without a warrant. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). Second, any object a police officer views
while conducting a lawful search may be seized without first obtaining a specific warrant
for that object. Id. at 465. These two applications of the plain view doctrine share the
common fact that "the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incrim-
inating the accused." Id. at 466. Without this prior justification, the plain view doctrine
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The open air exposure of Ciraolo's curtilage combined with the
fact that private and commercial flights in public airspace have be-
come routine, led the Court to hold that Ciraolo's expectation of
privacy from naked-eye, aerial surveillance was not reasonable.1 20
The fourth amendment, therefore, did not require the police to ob-
tain a warrant prior to conducting this type of surveillance from nav-
igable airspace.1 21
B. THE DISSENT
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell initially reiterated the
criteria the Court had used to determine the scope of fourth amend-
ment protection. He noted the Court's reliance on the common law
in order to decide which types of searches the framers could have
regarded as unreasonable.' 22 The common law, however, would
not always be dispositive, because the Court would interpret the
fourth amendment " 'in light of contemporary norms and condi-
tions.' ",123 Justice Powell stated that the Court delineated the ex-
tent of fourth amedment rights "by asking if police surveillance has
alone will not justify the seizure of evidence without a warrant unless "exigent circum-
stances" are present. Id. at 468.
The open view doctrine, on the other hand, allows police officers to observe without
a warrant those places, objects or activities-that an individual "knowingly exposes to the
public." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The open view doctrine does not require priorjustifica-
tion or inadvertance. Randall v. State, 458 So. 2d 822, 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
See Note, supra note 2, at 743 n.1 12; Leading Cases, Constitutional Law, 100 HARV. L. REv.
100, 137 n.15 (1986)[hereinafter Constitutional Law]; Warrantless Aerial Surveillance, supra
note 1, at 433 n.144.
The activities of the police officers in Ciraolo do not satisfy the requirements of the
plain view doctrine. For their surveillance to be constitutional, it is vital that Ciraolo did
in fact knowingly expose his backyard to public or open view.
The distinction between the plain view and open view doctrines may in part explain
the qualitative difference the California Court of Appeal found between routine, aerial
police patrols and focused police flights. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Be-
cause the court found that Ciraolo did not knowingly expose his backyard to the public,
the open view doctrine would not apply. Therefore, the Santa Clara Police could only
prove the constitutionality of their behavior through the plan view doctrine by claiming
either prior justification or inadvertance. A warrantless and focused flight could not
support either of these claims.
120 Ciraolo. 106 S. Ct. 1813.
121 Id. In a footnote, the Court suggested that warrantless aerial surveillance of the
curtilage may violate the fourth amendment when it becomes invasive or when such
surveillance combined with modern technology allows the police to view people, objects
or activities that the police could not see with their unaided eyes. Id. at 1813 n.3.
122 Id. at 1815 (Powell, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204, 217 (198 1)("The common law may... be instructive in determining what sorts of
searches the Framers of the Fourth Amendment regarded as reasonable.").
123 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1815 (quoting Steagald, 451 U.S. at 217 n.10); see United States
v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
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intruded on an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. ' 124
According to Justice Powell, the Katz test defines a fourth
amendment search by examining an individual's reasonable expec-
tation of privacy and not by examining "the physical position of the
police conducting the surveillance."' 25 Since modem technology
could allow the police to conduct a search without committing a
physical trespass, a fourth amendment test predicated upon physical
intrusion would not provide adequate protection in a modem
era. 126
Justice Powell then noted that the fourth amendment requires
that an expectation of privacy be reasonable or legitimate.' 27 He
124 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1815.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1815, 1817. In order to emphasize this point, Justice Powell invoked the
rationale of the dissenters in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928)(Bran-
deis,J., dissenting) and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 136 (1942) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting). In both cases, the Court decided that the government's use of electronic
surveillance methods to intercept private conversations did not violate the fourth
amendment, because the government agents had not physically intruded upon a "consti-
tutionally protected area." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466; Goldman, 316 U.S. at 134-35. In
Olmstead, Justice Brandeis found that the Court's holding would severely limit fourth
amendment protection in the future. He stated in his dissent:
The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is
not likely to stop with wire tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the
government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in
court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occur-
rences of the home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means
of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. "That places the liberty
of every man in the hands of every petty officer" was said by James Otis of much
lesser intrusions than these. To Lord Camden a far slighter intrusion seemed "sub-
versive of all the comforts of society." Can it be that the Constitution affords no
protection against such invasions of individual security?
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)(footnotes omitted). Justice Murphy
expressed this same view in his dissenting opinion in Goldman. He observed that
the search of one's home or office no longer requires physical entry, for science has
brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion of a person's privacy than
the direct and obvious methods of oppression which were detested by our forebears
and which inspired the Fourth Amendment. Surely the spirit motivating the fram-
ers of that Amendment would abhor these new devices no less.
Goldman, 316 U.S. at 139 (Murphy, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted). For all practical
purposes, the Court overruled both Olmstead and Goldman with the Katz decision. Katz,
389 U.S. at 353, 362.
127 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1816. According to Justice Powell, the Court has used the
words "reasonable" and "legitimate" synonymously. Id. at 1816 n.4. One commenta-
tor, however, disagrees with this conclusion, stating:
Although the Court has often used the terms "reasonable" and "legitimate" inter-
changeably, these terms reflect distinctly different expectations of privacy. A rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in information is a reasonable expectation that
information will not be discovered, given the information's content. A legitimate
expectation of privacy in information is a legitimate expectation that information
will not be discovered, regardless of the reasonableness of such an expectation
under the circumstances.
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found that the home constitutes a place where a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy will always be legitimate. 28 In the context of fourth
amendment jurisprudence, the Court viewed the curtilage as" 'part
of the home itself.' "129 According to Justice Powell, society would
also recognize as reasonable an individual's expectation of privacy
in "the area immediately surrounding [his] home."'' 0
Next, Justice Powell attacked the majority's analysis. The Jus-
tice noted that the Court would concur that an unreasonable search
would have taken place if the police officers did not obtain a warrant
prior to climbing over the fence or using a ladder in order to ob-
serve Ciraolo's backyard. 13 ' The Court, however, allowed the po-
lice to use an airplane in order to observe Ciraolo's backyard
without first obtaining a warrant. 13 2 Moreover, Justice Powell found
it irrelevant that the police conducted their overflight from naviga-
ble airspace and therefore did not physically intrude upon Ciraolo's
curtilage.13 3 According to Justice Powell, "[r]eliance on the manner
of surveillance is directly contrary to the standard of Katz, which
identifies a constitutionally protected privacy right by focusing on
the interests of the individual and of a free society."' I3 4
Justice Powell determined that the Court's holding rested upon
a single fact: as members of the public fly through navigable air-
space, they may look down at the homes and backyards that they
happen to be flying over at the time.'3 5 Because private citizens
Comment, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Post-Katz
Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191, 195 (1986)(footnotes omitted).
128 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1816 (Powell, J., dissenting).
129 Id. (citation omitted). The Court, however, has never specifically extended all of
the home's fourth amendment protection to the curtilage. See, e.g., Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 n.11 (1984)("Nor is it necessary in these cases to consider the
scope of the curtilage exception to the open fields doctrine or the degree of Fourth
Amendment protection afforded the curtilage, as opposed to the home itsef.")(emphasis ad-
ded); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 (1986)("Mhe curtilage
doctrine evolved to protect much the same kind of privacy as that covering the interior of the
structure .... )(emphasis added).
130 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1816.
131 Id. at 1817. See United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 993-94 (4th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1978).
132 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1817. In the majority opinion, the Court sought to limit
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz to its particular facts. See supra notes 117-18 and
accompanying text. Justice Powell, however, attempted to draw an analogy between
electronic surveillance equipment and airplanes by referring to the airplane as "a prod-
uct of modem techology." Id. With his reference to United States v. Van Dyke, 643
F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1981), Justice Powell appeared also to draw an analogy between an
airplane and a very tall ladder.
133 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1817.
134 Id. (emphasis in original).
135 Id. at 1818.
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could view Ciraolo's backyard, he had no reasonable expectation of
privacy from police observation as well. 136 Justice Powell found this
reasoning to be flawed for several reasons.
First, observation by passengers on private or commercial
flights posed very little risk to Ciraolo's privacy. 137 Even though
Ciraolo did not take any precautions to prevent aerial surveillance of
his backyard, he did not "'knowingly expose' it "'to the pub-
lic.' "138 Since aerial observation by members of the public on air-
planes is a "remote possibility," Justice Powell concluded that "[i]t
is no accident that, as a matter of common experience, many people
build fences around their residential areas, but few build roofs over
their backyards."' 13 9
Second, the Court incorrectly relied upon Knotts.' 40 Knotts in-
volved activities taking place on public streets and highways.' 4 ' The
fourth amendment does not prohibit the police from observing, just
as members of the public could, activities occurring on a public
street.' 42 The same conclusion, however, cannot necessarily be
drawn concerning activities occurring "within the private area im-
mediately adjacent to a home."' 143 The Court reached its conclusion
based upon the "judgment that the risk to privacy posed by the re-
mote possibility that a private airplane passenger will notice out-
door activities is equivalent to the risk of official aerial
surveillance."'' 44 The Court failed to recognize that a "qualitative
difference" existed between purposeful police surveillance of the
curtilage conducted in order to discover evidence and the various
reasons for which members of the public use navigable airspace.145
Justice Powell then concluded that Ciraolo had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy from aerial surveillance by the police of his cur-
136 Id.
137 Id. Justice Powell noted that "[t]ravelers on commercial flights, as well as private
planes used for business or personal reasons, normally obtain at most a fleeting, anony-
mous, and nondiscriminating glimpse of the landscape and buildings over which they
pass." Id. (footnote omitted).
138 Id. (citation omitted).
139 Id.
140 See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
141 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1818 (Powell, J., dissenting).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. (footnote omitted).
145 Id. Justice Powell found that "[miembers of the public used the air space for
travel, business, or pleasure, not for the purpose of observing activities taking place
within residential yards." Id. The same argument, however, could also be made to ap-
ply to public streets where police may constitutionally conduct focused surveillance
without first obtaining a warrant. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
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tilage.' 46 Therefore, the police overflight constituted a search
under the fourth amendment. 47 Since this warrantless search did
not fall within the exceptions to the warrant requirement, the search
violated the fourth amendment.148
Finally, Justice Powell expressed his concern about the Court's
holding. He saw "serious implications" concerninng familial activi-
ties conducted within the curtilage of the home.' 49 He noted that
"after today, families can expect to be free of official surveillance
only when they retreat behind the walls of their homes."' 5 0
VII. ANALYSIS
As Justice Frankfurter stated over twenty years ago, "[t]he
course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures ... has not-
to put it mildly-run smooth."' 151 In Ciraolo, the conflicting conclu-
sions as to what constitutes a search in the context of aerial surveil-
lance exemplifies an inherent weakness in the Katz test. The first
prong of the test focuses largely upon objective criteria through the
examination of the actions manifesting the subjective expectations
of the individual seeking to maintain his privacy. 152 The second
prong of the test involves a subjective type of inquiry on the part of
the Court. The Court must determine whether society would honor
as reasonable a particular individual's expectation of privacy. 153 In
an age where a clear societal consensus fails to exist concerning
many types of individual rights to privacy, the Katz test leaves the
Court in a position where it must attempt its own best guess as to
what privacy expectations society would view as reasonable.
One commentator argues that when the Court attempts to de-
termine the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy, it relies
upon "a set of largely arbitrary criteria."1 54 Because of the arbitrary
nature of the second prong of the Katz test, the adjudication of a
reasonable expectation of privacy becomes vulnerable to the
Court's "ideological oscillations."' 155 Instead of society defining for
the Court the scope of an individual's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, the Katz test allows the Court to dictate to society the reasona-
146 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1819.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1819 n.10.
150 Id.
151 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
152 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
153 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811.
154 Comment, supra note 127, at 196.
155 Id. at 192.
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bleness of an individual's privacy expectations. This flaw in the Katz
test explains how the majority and the dissenters in Ciraolo could
employ the same test and still reach vastly different conclusions as
to the reasonableness of Ciraolo's expectation of privacy.
A. A QUESTION OF EXPOSURE
The Court found, inter alia, that society will not honor as rea-
sonable Ciraolo's expectation of privacy from aerial survellance of
his backyard, because he knowingly exposed his backyard to all
members of the public who routinely fly in the navigable airspace
above it. 156 The Court has continually emphasized that knowing ex-
posure does not take place when an individual takes "normal pre-
cautions to maintain his privacy."'' 57 In his majority opinion, Chief
Justice Burger did not specifically state what establishes knowing ex-
posure to aerial surveillance or what "normal" precautions Ciraolo
might have taken to preclude aerial surveillance of his curtilage.
Justice Powell, in his dissent, viewed Ciraolo's construction of a
high, double fence around his backyard as a normal precaution
against both ground-level and aerial surveillance.15 8 The lower
courts are divided as to whether or not a fence, or any other ob-
struction, creates an expectation of privacy from aerial
surveillance.15 9
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, a case decided the same day as
Ciraolo, involved the Environmental Protection Agency's (E.P.A.)
use of aerial photography of Dow's two thousand acre industrial
complex.160 The Court noted that Dow did not make "any effort to
protect [itself] against aerial surveillance"' 16' and held that the
E.P.A.'s warrantless aerial photography of the Dow facility did not
violate the fourth amendment.' 62 Combining the Court's dicta in
Dow and Ciraolo, it would appear that if Ciraolo had taken specific
precautions against aerial observation he would not have knowingly
exposed his backyard to those members of the public flying in the
navigable airspace above his house.
The California Court of Appeals recently dealt with this issue
and rejected the contention that specific precautions against aerial
156 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812-13.
157 Id. at 1812 (quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980)). See supra note
97.
158 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1818 (PowelIJ., dissenting).
159 Annotation, supra note 2, at 787-90; Comment, supra note 2, at 745-46.
160 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
161 Id. at 1829 n.4.
162 Id. at 1827.
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surveillance will make warrantless, aerial observations by the police
unconstitutional.' 63 The court of appeal refused to employ the
Supreme Court's dicta in Dow concerning specific precautions
against aerial surveillance to limit the broad holding in Ciraolo. Dow
involved the warrantless aerial surveillance of the open fields. 164
Ciraolo, on the other hand, dealt with warrantless aerial surveillance
of the curtilage.' 65 This key factual distinction between the two
cases, in addition to the Supreme Court's refusal to specifically limit
its broad holding in the Ciraolo decision, led the court of appeal to
conclude that the dicta in Dow could not be applied to the Supreme
Court's holding in Ciraolo.166
Therefore, according to the court of appeal's interpretation of
Ciraolo, it does not matter what precautions an individual may take
to preclude aerial observation of his backyard. When law enforce-
ment officials flying in navigable airspace can peek through even the
most formidable of defense systems, an individual has still know-
ingly exposed his property, and warrantless aerial surveillance of his
property will be constitutional.
If the Court's decision in Ciraolo truly means that the fourth
amendment does not protect an individual's backyard from aerial
surveillance no matter what "normal precautions" that individual
may take, it has single-handedly emasculated much of the intent be-
hind the fourth amendment. As Professor LaFave observed:
Anyone can protect himself against surveillance by retiring to the cel-
lar, cloaking all the windows with thick caulking, turning off the lights
and remaining absolutely quiet. This much withdrawal is not required
in order to claim the benefit of the [fourth] amendment, because, if it
were, the amendment's benefit would be too stingy to preserve the
kind of open society to which we are committed and in which the
amendment is supposed to function. What kind of society is that? 167
It ultimately becomes a matter of conjecture as to which view, the
Court's view in Ciraolo or Professor LaFave's view, society would
agree with and find reasonable.
In the Katz decision, the Court expressly recognized that the
constitutional protection provided to reasonable expectations of
privacy does not automatically vanish once an individual dares to




167 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 10, § 2.2, at 261 (quoting Amsterdam, supra note 64, at
402). Justice Powell expressed these same concerns in his dissent. California v. Ciraolo,
106 S. Ct. 1809, 1819 n. 10 (1986)(Powell,J., dissenting). See W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 8.1 at 8-3 (1985).
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venture out of doors and voluntarily subjects himself, his property
or his activities to limited public exposure. While the Court has
continually repeated the majority's language in Katz that what "a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection,"' 16 it has
apparently forgotten the language that follows and tempers that
broad sentence. The Constitution may still provide protection to
what an individual "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public."' 69
Since the public had access to the navigable airspace above
Ciraolo's property, it also had limited opportunities to view his
backyard from the air. Ciraolo, for his part, made an attempt to pre-
serve his privacy interest in his property. Rather than examining
what protections the Constitution may have provided Ciraolo's ex-
pectation of privacy, the Court simply concluded that Ciraolo's ex-
pectations were not reasonable because the public had limited
visual access to his property.
This parsimonious view of constitutional protections in Ciraolo
follows an overall trend in the Court's holdings limiting the scope of
fourth amendment protection concerning expectations of privacy.
According to Professor LaFave, the Court has often adopted an "ex-
ceedingly narrow view of Katz."'170 The Court has relied upon the
"fallacious notion that privacy is an all-or-nothing proposition and
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy vis d vis the
government concerning information partly exposed in a very limited
way to a limited group."'' When even a remote possibility of expo-
sure exists, as it did in Ciraolo, the Constitution can offer no protec-
tion to a person's expectation of privacy.' 72
In Ciraolo, Chief Justice Burger also attempted to support the
knowing exposure argument by stressing that, along with passen-
gers on private and commercial airplanes, a "power company repair
mechanic on a pole overlooking the yard" could have viewed
Ciraolo's curtilage. 173 This rationale directly conflicts with the ex-
press language of the Court in United States v. Karo.174 Writing the
opinion for the Court, Justice White noted that "[t]here would be
nothing left of the Fourth Amendment right to privacy if anything
168 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
169 Id.
170 LaFave, Nine Key Decisions Expand Authority to Search and Seize, 69 A.B.A. J. 1740
(1983).
171 Id.
172 Constitutional Law, supra note 119, at 141-42.
173 California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1813 (1986).
174 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
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that a hypothetical government informant might reveal is stripped of
constitutional protection."1 75 Taking the Court's logic in Ciraolo
and extending it to the circumstances involved in the Katz case, Katz
would not have had a "reasonable expectation of privacy in his con-
versation because the person to whom he was speaking might have
divulged the contents of the conversation."' 176
B. THE USE OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY
In Ciraolo, ChiefJustice Burger and Justice Powell disagreed as
to whether an airplane constituted a form of modem technology.
While such a debate may appear to be nothing more than an argu-
ment over semantics, the determination of the question is relevant
in defining the scope of fourth amendment protection over expecta-
tions of privacy.
The Court held in Karo that when law enforcement officials oc-
cupy a public vantage point and modern technology provides them
with information that they could not have gained through visual sur-
veillance alone, the use of this technology constitutes a search under
the fourth amendment.177 Because the Santa Clara Police could
only confirm their anonymous tip by using aerial surveillance, defin-
ing the airplane they used as a product of modern technology, as
Justice Powell did, would mean that the police conducted a fourth
amendment search.
Chief Justice Burger argued that in a day and age where "pri-
vate and commercial flight in the public airways is routine," it would
be unreasonable for Ciraolo to expect the Constitution to shield his
backyard from the inquiring glances of those flying overhead. 178 To
determine a reasonable expectation of privacy based upon whether
a particular police practice is routine, however, allows the police and
not society to determine the reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy.' 7 9
The implications of the Ciraolo decision will also create future
difficulties concerning law enforcement officials and their increasing
use of cameras and helicopters. The Court's dicta in both Ciraolo
and Dow provides some guidance as to the extent to which the
175 Id. at 716 n.4. (emphasis in original).
176 Id. Justice White apparently did not want to extend the Karo Court's dicta to
Ciraolo. He formed part of the majority.
177 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
178 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
179 Comment, Aerial Surveillance: A Plane View of The Fourth Amendment, 18 GONZ. L.
REV. 307, 318 (1982/83).
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fourth amendment will allow the police to use aerial photography
without first having to obtain a warrant.
The use of aerial photography without a warrant unconstitu-
tionally impinges upon privacy interests at the point where it allows
the police to see and record "those intimate associations, objects or
activities otherwise imperceptible" to them.' 80 While discussing in
Dow whether the picture taken with a sophisticated aerial mapping
camera violated the fourth amendment, ChiefJustice Burger found
"[n]o objects as small as 1/2-inch diameter such as a class ring, for
example, are recognizable, nor are there any such identifiable
human faces or secret documents captured in such fashion as to im-
plicate more serious privacy concerns."' 181 This dicta implies that if
the Santa Clara Police had used a high-power camera to take aerial
photographs of Ciraolo's backyard in order to facilitate the identifi-
cation of Ciraolo or the purchasers of his marijuana, this would con-
stitute a warrantless search in violation of the fourth amendment.
Chief Justice Burger in part based his conclusion that society
would not recognize as reasonable Ciraolo's expectation of privacy
from aerial surveillance on the fact that the police made their obser-
vations from navigable airspace, a place where they had a right to
be. 182 One lower federal court has recently held that warrantless
observations not conducted in navigable airspace would violate the
fourth amendment. 183
According to federal regulations, fixed-wing aircraft may only
lawfully navigate at or above certain specific altitudes. 184 Unlike air-
planes, the airspace for the lawful operation of a helicoptor consists
of an altitude at which it may be operated "without hazard to per-
sons or property on the surface."' 85 Helicoptors, therefore, may le-
180 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813 n.3.
181 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1827 n.5 (1986).
182 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813. ChiefJustice Burger also expressed in Dow the fact that
the aerial photographer's aircraft continually remained in navigable airspace throughout
the flight. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1822.
183 In light of the Ciraolo and Dow decisions, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit observed:
In both cases the Court mentioned that the official aircraft conducting the searches
was within public navigable airspace. Federal statutes and regulations, defining
navigable airspace, were cited. It seems that if, to take Dow as an example, the EPA-
rented airplane had not been in navigable airspace, a different result would have
followed, even though such reasoning makes constitutional protections under the
Fourth Amendment depend, in part, on the contours of statutes and regulations,
which are subject to change by Congress or the issuing regulatory agency.
Bissonette v. Haig, 800 F.2d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1986).
184 See supra note 79.
185 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(d)(1986). The subsection concerning helicoptors states:
(d) Helicoptors. Helicoptors may be operated at less than the minimums prescribed
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gally fly below navigable airspace.18 6 Lower courts thus face a
fourth amendment dilemma when a police department conducts
warrantless aerial surveillance with a helicoptor lawfully flying below
navigable airspace.
The California Court of Appeals recently dealt with this ques-
tion in People v. Sabo.187 The court concluded that "Ciraolo does not
declare a rule to govern aerial surveillance of the curtilage in all cir-
cumstances and at any altitude and from any platform." 188 In cases
involving the lawful operation of a helicoptor outside of navigable
airspace, the court decided not to declare a broad rule and returned
to a case-by-case analysis in order to determine the constitutionality
of this type of surveillance.1 8 9
C. AN ALTERNATIVE STANDARD
As Justice Harlan observed in United States v. White, the purpose
of the fourth amendment is "not to shield 'wrongdoers'; but to se-
cure a measure of privacy and sense of personal security throughout
society."1 90 The Court's holding in Ciraolo weakens, rather than
secures, individual privacy by allowing law enforcement officials to
scrutinize from the air what they could not constitutionally view at
ground-level without first obtaining a warrant. As long as the re-
motest possibility of aerial exposure to the public exists, the police
may constitutionally look as well. Precautions against exposure,
therefore, become virtually useless.
Given the importance of the privacy right at stake and the rela-
tive lack of societal consensus as to how much the government may
impinge upon that right before its behavior becomes unreasonable,
the Court's broad, all-or-nothing holding in Ciraolo is inappropriate.
Instead of developing one all-encompassing rule of constitu-
tional law, the Court should have at least examined the possibility of
a modified warrant requirement in cases involving aerial surveil-
lance. Under a modified warrant standard, the police would not
have to show probable cause in order to obtain a warrant. For ex-
in paragraph (b) or (c) of this section if the operation is conducted without hazard
to persons or property on the surface. In addition, each person operating a
helicoptor shall comply with routes or altitudes prescribed for helicoptors by the
Administrator.
Id. See supra note 79 for the complete text of subsections (b) and (c) of 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.79.
186 People v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, -, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170, 174-75 (1986).
187 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1986).
188 Id. at-, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
189 Id. at-, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
190 401 U.S. 745, 790 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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ample, a "reasonable suspicion" standard might suffice. 19 1
A neutral and detached magistrate would also be present to
protect reasonable expectations of privacy against undue police in-
terference. The magistrates, like the lower courts, will no doubt
reach conflicting conclusions when they attempt any type of Katz
analysis. But even under this admittedly inefficient system, the po-
lice will not have completely free rein regarding aerial surveillance
from navigable airspace as they do under Ciraolo.
The employment of some type of lesser probable cause stan-
dard, rather than no standard at all, would demonstrate that a quali-
tative difference exists between intentional and accidental police
aerial surveillance. The exclusionary rule itself is a manifestation of
the Supreme Court's opinion that such a qualitative difference does
in fact exist. The Court has noted that the purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule is to deter the police from violating the warrant require-
ment of the fourth amendment, and the application of the
exclusionary rule becomes unwarranted if it would not deter police
conduct. 192 While the exclusionary rule will deter intentional police
conduct, it has a substantially weaker deterrent affect concerning ac-
cidental police conduct. 193
This view of the exclusionary rule leads to the conclusion that a
warrant requirement for aerial surveillance would deter intentional
police searches but would not deter accidental police searches of the
property the police happen to be flying over at any given time.
Therefore, when an individual like Ciraolo can adequately prove
that the police intentionally used aerial surveillance in order to view
his specific residence, the evidence gathered during and subsequent
to the unconstitutional search must fall within the exclusionary rule.
Since the exclusionary rule cannot deter accidental conduct, evi-
dence obtained while the police unintentionally survey property or
activities from navigable airspace should not fall within the exclu-
sionary rule.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in California v. Ciraolo that the po-
lice's intentional and warrantless aerial surveillance of a specific res-
idence does not violate the Constitution gives law enforcement
agencies broader powers while at the same time substantially lessen-
191 Warrantless Aerial Surveillance, supra note 1, at 435.
192 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908-17 (1984); see supra note 29 and accompa-
nying text.
193 Leon, 568 U.S. at 908-17.
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ing the scope of fourth amendment protection of privacy expecta-
tions. As long as the police conduct their surveillance from
navigable airspace, an individual who knowingly exposes his prop-
erty or activities to the open air, no matter how slight this exposure
may be or where such exposure takes place, automatically subjects
himself to the scrutiny of the police. This calls into question what
privacy protections from aerial surveillance remain, if any, once an
individual dares to step outside his home.
In addition, the Ciraolo decision demonstrates that the Katz test,
used to determine the reasonableness of an individual's privacy ex-
pectations, has increasingly become a more subjective test. Both
the majority and the dissenters employed this test, yet both sides
reached vastly differing results concerning society's view of the rea-
sonableness of Ciraolo's privacy expectations. This subjectiveness
decreases any predictability the test may have had and perhaps sig-
nals the beginning of the end for the Katz test.
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